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Abstract
Many empirical studies of auctions show that prices of identical goods sold sequentially follow a
declining path. Declining prices have been viewed as an anomaly, because the theoretical models of
auctions predict that the price sequence should either be a martingale (with independent signals and no
informational externalities), or a submartingale (with a¢ liated signals). This paper shows that declining
prices, the afternoon e¤ect, arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk. A bidder is averse to
price risk if he prefers to win an object at a certain price, rather than at a random price with the same
expected value. When bidders have independent signals and there are no informational externalities,
only the e¤ect of aversion to price risk is present and the price sequence is a supermartingale. When there
are informational externalities, even with independent signals, there is a countervailing, informational
e¤ect, which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction. This may help explaining the
more complex price paths we observe in some auctions.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D44, D82.
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Theoretical work on auctions will almost certainly have to remove the assumption of risk neu-
tral bidders if it is to explain the full range of interesting empirical results from real auctions.
(Ashenfelter, 1989, p.31.)
1 Introduction
The classic theoretical models of sequential auctions of identical goods predict constant, or increasing,
average prices across rounds. Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that with independent
private values the price sequence is a martingale (the expected value of Pk+1, the price in round k + 1,
conditional on Pk, the price in round k, is equal to Pk), while with a¢ liated values the price sequence is a
submartingale (the expected value of Pk+1 conditional on Pk is higher than Pk).
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is at odds with the classic theory: prices most
frequently decline across rounds. The puzzle associated with this evidence has become known as the after-
noon e¤ect (because after a morning auction, often the second round takes place in the afternoon), or the
declining price anomaly. Sequential auctions where prices have been shown to decline include wine (Ashen-
felter, 1989, McAfee and Vincent, 1993), owers (van den Berg et al., 2001), livestock (Buccola, 1982),
gold jewelry (Chanel et al., 1996), china from shipwrecks (Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2007), stamps (Thiel
and Petry, 1995), Picasso prints (Pesando and Shum, 1996), art (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), condomini-
ums (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992), commercial real estate (Lusht, 1994). There is also experimental
evidence of declining prices (Burns, 1985, and Keser and Olson, 1996). Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003)
contains a general survey that focuses on art auctions.
In this paper, I propose a simple explanation of the afternoon e¤ect: aversion to price risk. A bidder
is averse to price risk if he prefers to win an object at a certain price, rather than at a random price with
the same expected value.
The prediction that, with independent private values and risk neutral bidders, the price sequence is a
martingale can be interpreted as a manifestation of the law of one price. Optimal bidder behavior would
seem to require that the law of one price holds generally. After all, if the equilibrium price were known to
be higher on average in a given round, shouldnt bidders lower their bids in that round?
It is easiest to explain the intuition for why aversion to price risk generates declining prices in the case
of a two-round, second-price auction with private values and unit-demand bidders. The price in the last
round will be determined by the second highest bid. The crucial observation is that in the rst round each
bidder chooses his optimal bid assuming that he will win and will be the price setter; that is, he assumes
that his bid is tied with the highest bid of his opponents. This is because a small change in his bid only
matters when the bidder wins and is the price setter. The fundamental implication of this observation
is that in choosing his optimal bid, a bidder views the rst-round price as certain (equal to his bid) and
the second-round price as a random variable (equal to the second highest, second-round bid). Optimality
requires that the bidder be indi¤erent between winning in the rst or in the second round. Aversion to
price risk then implies that the expected second-round price (conditional on the rst-round price) must
be lower than the rst-round price. The di¤erence is the risk premium that the bidder must receive to be
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indi¤erent between winning at a random, rather than a certain, price.
The result that aversion to price risk generates a tendency for prices to decline, called an aversion to
price risk e¤ect, and its intuition, is very general. It holds for auctions with more than two rounds, for
second-price, rst-price, and English auctions. It also holds if there are informational externalities (i.e., if
values are not purely private), and if bidders have multi-unit demand.
Aversion to price risk is di¤erent from risk aversion, which had been informally proposed by Ashenfelter
(1989) as a possible explanation of declining prices. Models of risk aversion (e.g., Matthews, 1983, and
McAfee and Vincent, 1993) assume that a bidder has a monetary value for the object, so that risk aversion
is dened on the di¤erence between the monetary value of the object and its price. Aversion to price risk,
on the contrary, is dened on price alone. It implies separability of a bidders payo¤ between utility from
winning an object and utility from the bidders monetary wealth (or disutility from paying the price).
McAfee and Vincent (1993) demonstrated that risk aversion is not a convincing explanation of the
afternoon e¤ect. They studied a two-round, private-value, second-price auction, and showed that prices
decline only if bidders display increasing absolute risk aversion, which seems implausible. Under the more
plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk-aversion, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist
and average prices need not decline.
To appreciate the di¤erence between the concepts of risk aversion and aversion to price risk, it is useful
to revisit the familiar result that with a single object for sale and risk aversion, the average price is higher
in a rst-price than in a second-price auction. It is simple to show that a similar result also holds when
bidders are averse to price risk. The intuition, however, is di¤erent. In a rst-price auction, the price is
certain for the winning bidder; it equals his bid. In a second-price auction, on the contrary, the price is
a random variable. On average the price must be lower in order to compensate the bidder for the price
risk. (Appendix A shows that with aversion to price risk all standard auctions are payo¤ equivalent for
the bidders.) Thus, in e¤ect, in a rst-price auction a bidder buys insurance against price variations. On
the other hand, the intuition that is commonly given for why risk aversion raises the bid in a rst-price
auction is that, by bidding higher, a bidder buys insurance against the possibility of losing the auction
(e.g., see Krishna, 2002, p.40).
There are other models in the literature that generate an afternoon e¤ect. They include winners having
the option to buy additional units (Black and de Meza, 1992), heterogeneity of objects (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 1994, Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994, Gale and Hausch, 1994), ordering of the objects for sale by
declining value (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), absentee bidders (Ginsburgh, 1998), an unknown number of
objects for sale (Jeitschko, 1999), asymmetry among bidders (Gale and Stegeman, 2001), etc.
I view aversion to price risk as complementary to the other explanations given in the literature. The
explanation based on aversion to price risk has the advantage of applying very generally, without requiring
any additional modication of the classic model. This is an important advantage because, as the empirical
evidence suggests, declining prices have been found to prevail even with no buyersoption to buy additional
objects, with identical objects, etc.
While declining prices are much more common, increasing prices have also been documented in the
empirical literature. For example, they were found for library books by Deltas and Kosmopolou (2001),
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watches by Chanel et al. (1996), wool by Jones et al. (2004), and Israeli cable tv by Gandal (1997).
A second, general contribution of this paper is to show that a¢ liated types are not needed to explain
increasing prices. Informational externalities alone, even with independent types, push prices to increase
across rounds.1 There are informational externalities (or interdependent types), if a bidders payo¤ from
winning an object directly depends on the types of the other bidders. To understand the intuition for
the e¤ect of informational externalities, consider a two-round, second-price auction with risk-neutral, unit-
demand bidders. As I have already argued, a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning in the rst
and in the second round, conditional on the event that he wins the rst round and he is the price setter.
Thus, when bidders are risk neutral, the rst-round price must be equal to the expected second-round
price conditional on this event, which is lower than the expected second-round price conditional on the
rst-round price. This is because the rst-round winner will generally bid higher and have a higher signal
than the rst-round price setter, and the value of an object is an increasing function of all bidderssignals.
When bidders are averse to price risk and there are informational externalities, the paper shows how
to separate the aversion to price risk e¤ect, which reduces prices from one round to the next, from the
informational e¤ect, which increases prices from round to round. The combined presence of the two
e¤ects may help explaining the more complex price paths, with prices increasing between some rounds and
decreasing between others, that we sometimes observe in the data (e.g., see Jones et al., 2004).
Most of the paper studies the rst-price and second-price sequential auctions with unit-demand bidders,
but in Section 8 I show that the results extend to English auctions and, to some extent, to bidders with
multi-unit demand.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the equilibria of
the rst-price and second-price auction. One delicate issue is what information is revealed from round to
round. The natural candidate is to reveal the winning price in each round. However, the existence of an
equilibrium with increasing bidding functions in a second-price auction is potentially problematic with this
information policy, because the price setter in a round is a participant in the next round. I show that with
no informational externalities an increasing equilibrium exists, but it does not if there are informational
externalities. To study the second-price auction with informational externalities, I assume that only the
winning bid is announced (Mezzetti et al., 2008, discuss this assumption in a model with a¢ liated values and
risk neutral bidders). Section 4 presents the afternoon e¤ect when there are no informational externalities.
Section 5 looks at risk neutral bidders with informational externalities. Section 6 studies the general model
with aversion to price risk and informational externalities. It denes and discusses the aversion to price risk
e¤ect and the informational e¤ect. Section 7 presents a calibrated example that shows how the data from
empirical studies can be reproduced for plausible values of an aversion to price risk and an informational
externality parameter. Section 8 discusses extensions of the model and the robustness of the main results.
In particular, it looks at English auctions and bidders with multi-unit demand. When studying sequential
English auctions, it is important to formulate a tractable model that allows bidders not to reveal all the
information in their hands during the rst round. Section 9 concludes. Most of the proofs and additional
1Stochastic scale e¤ects (Jeitschko and Wolfstetter, 1998) and uncertainty about the number of rounds (Feng and Chatterjee,
2005) may also generate increasing prices.
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technical results are in the appendices.
2 The Model
There are K identical objects to be auctioned and N symmetric bidders, N > K. Each bidder has unit
demand. Bidder i observes the realization xi of a signal Xi, a random variable with support [x; x]: I assume
that the signals are i.i.d. random variables with density f and distribution F . Let the random variable
X i be the vector of signals of all bidders except i, with x i a realized value of X i. If i wins an object,
the price he pays at auction, P , is a random variable which depends, through the bids, on his realized
signal, or type, xi and the types of all other bidders X i. Let p be a price realization. If a bidder does not
win an object, he pays nothing.
Let q be the probability of winning an object, G(p) a winning price distribution, and L = (q;G(p)) a
compound lottery. Bidder i has von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, which only depend
on the type prole x 2 X = Xi  X i if i wins the object. Thus, we can normalize the utility of player
i to zero when he does not win an object. Moreover, bidder is preferences have an expected utility
representation U(x; q;G(p)) =
R
qu(x; p)dG(p), where u(x; p), the utility of the certain outcome of winning
an object at price p; satises the following assumption.
Assumption A1. The function u(x; p) is strictly decreasing in p and additively separable in x and p:
For any distribution G(p), let E[P ] =
R
pdG(p): It is u(x;E[P ])  R u(x; p)dG(p):
If the inequality in A1 is strict for all G(p), we say that bidders are averse to price risk. If the inequality
holds as an equality for all G(p), then the model reduces to the classical case of risk neutral bidders. It is
immediate from A1 that there exist a function V and a convex function `, such that we can write bidder
is utility when he wins an object at a price p and the type prole is x = (xi; x i) as:
u(x; p) = V (xi; x i)  `(p):
The rst component, V (xi; x i), is the utility bidder i receives from consuming one object when the type
prole is x. The second component, `(p), is the loss, or disutility, from a payment p to the seller. Think of
B(M p) as the payo¤, or benet, from a money amountM p, whereM is the initial money endowment,
then  `(p) = B(M   p).
The realized valuation of bidder i, Vi = V (xi; x i), depends on the value x i of the type of all other
bidders. I will make the additional assumptions that V (xi; x i) is positive, smooth, the same for all bidders
i, symmetric in xj , j 6= i, and increasing in all its arguments with @Vi@xi 
@Vi
@xj
 0: The latter assumption
(which is commonly made when there are interdependent valuations, e.g., see Dasgupta Maskin, 2000)
guarantees the allocational e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
It is useful to distinguish between the case of no informational externalities, when the valuation function
of a bidder does not depend on the other bidderstypes, V (xi; x i) = xi, and the case with informational
externalities, in which V depends also on the signal realization x i: In the literature, the case of no
informational externalities is referred to as private values.
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Suppose that a bidders value Vi for the object is the sum of two independent random variables Wi and
Z, and that Wi has support [0; 1], while Z has support [100; 101]: Suppose further that bidder i observes
the value wi taken by the random variable Wi, but not the value of Z: By dening the random variable
Xi =Wi+EZ, we can think that each bidder observes the value of Xi, with support [EZ;EZ+1]; clearly,
there is a predominant common value component to a bidders valuation, even though bidders have no
private information about it. For this reason, I prefer to refer to Vi = xi as the case of no informational
externalities, rather than private values. That bidders have no private information about the common
value component of their valuations is consistent with the common practice of auction houses, such as
Christies and Sothebys, to provide detailed expert estimates for each item at auction. When, on the
other hand, there is private information about the common value component of the items for sale, then
the appropriate model is one with informational externalities.
The loss function ` is the same for all bidders, strictly increasing with `(0) = 0, and convex, reecting
aversion to price risk on the part of bidders. Let  = ` 1 be the inverse of ` with respect to the realized
price p;  is strictly increasing and concave. An example of a loss function which will be used in Section 7
is the constant relative price-risk aversion function `(p) = p
1+r
1+r ; another example is the constant absolute
price-risk aversion function `(pi) = ep:
In the literature on risk aversion in auctions, it is commonly assumed that bidders have an equivalent
monetary value for the object v(xi; x i); risk aversion is captured by writing the payo¤ when winning
at price p as u (v(xi; x i)  p) ; where u is a concave function. Most studies assume no informational
externalities: v(xi; x i) = xi. As I pointed out in the introduction, McAfee and Vincent (1993) show that
such a model only generates decreasing prices if bidders have increasing absolute risk aversion, and it is
not very tractable (a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist with decreasing absolute risk aversion).
Bidders that are averse to price risk do not have an equivalent monetary value for the good on sale,
but the good contributes additively to the utility of money. This is consistent, for example, with bidders
viewing the good for sale as an asset that gives a stream of future payo¤s. According to this interpretation,
V (xi; x i) is the discounted future payo¤, while `(p) is the current cost of acquiring the good at price p.
This interpretation can also incorporate the possibility that a winner may resell the object in the future,
so that the signal Xi includes information about future market value.
3 Sequential Auctions: Equilibrium
In this section I study the equilibrium bidding strategies in the sequential rst-price and second-price
auctions, in which one object is sold in each of K successive rounds. In round k  K of a sequential
auction, the bidding function of a remaining bidder depends not only on his type, but also on the common
history of announced prices and bids from previous rounds. I will start by assuming that at the end of each
round the bid of the winner is announced. In a rst-price auction, this is equivalent to announcing the
selling price, the standard practice in real auctions. I will look for symmetric equilibria in which the bid of
a player is an increasing function of his type (everything else constant) in each round k. Thus, revealing
the winning bid is equivalent to revealing the signal of the winning bidder.
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By assuming that the winning bid is what is announced at the end of each round in a sequential second-
price auction, I guarantee that the same information is revealed as in a sequential rst-price auction format.
On the other hand, if the bidding functions are increasing, revealing the price in a round of the sequential
second-price auction amounts to revealing the type of the highest loser, a bidder who will be present in
the next round. This has potentially quite di¤erent informational implications than revealing the type
of the winner, which will not be present in future rounds (because of unit demand). I will show that in
the case of no informational externalities the equilibrium bidding functions are the same irrespectively of
whether the price or the winning bid are announced. I will also show, by way of an example, that with
informational externalities an increasing equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction does not exist
when the winning prices are announced.
The bidding functions of the sequential rst-price and second-price auctions were rst derived by Weber
(1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the case of risk neutral bidders.2 The next three theorems, whose
proofs are in Appendix A, extend Milgrom and Webers results to the case of aversion to price risk.
3.1 The Sequential First-Price Auction
In a sequential rst-price auction, one object is sold in each of K rounds to the highest bidder at a price
equal to the highest bid.
Dene the random variable Y (n)j , an order statistic, as the j-th highest type of bidder out of n. Denote
the distribution and density function of Y (n)j as F
(n)
j and f
(n)
j :
With a small abuse of notation, I will write bidder is valuation as the following random variable:
V

Xi; Y
(N 1)
K ;    ; Y (N 1)1

= E
h
V (Xi; X i) jXi; Y (N 1)K ;    ; Y (N 1)1
i
:
Since I will look for an increasing equilibrium, and will assume that the winning prices are revealed, in
round k of a sequential rst-price auction the bid function will depend on the bidders type x and on the
types y1; :::; yk 1 of the winners in previous rounds.
Theorem 1 Along the equilibrium path of the symmetric equilibrium of the sequential rst-price auction
with price (or winning bid) announcement, bidders follow the bidding functions
S1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
:
If there are no informational externalities, the bidding functions can be written as
S1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 
S1
k (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1
i
:
In the formula for S11 it should be understood that Y
(N 1)
0 = x, the top of the signal support. Observe
that S1k is an increasing function of all its arguments when there are informational externalities, while
with no informational externalities S1k does not depend on the types of the winners of previous rounds
(equivalently, it does not depend on the price history).
2Milgrom and Weber (1982) worked with a¢ liated types. As they say in the foreword added to the published version,
because of a¢ liation the proofs have to be considered in doubt; see Mezzetti et al. (2008), for some recent progress.
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It is useful to view `
 
S1k (x; :::)

as the loss bid associated with the price bid S1k (x; :::): In the last
round, a bidder of type x submits a loss bid equal to what he would value the object if he won and had
the same signal realization as his highest opponent. Thus, for example, with no informational externalities
his loss bid is equal to the highest expected value of his remaining opponents, conditional on their values
being lower than his value. This is the same loss bid that the bidder would make in a single-sale, rst-price
auction. Bids in a round k before the last follow from the indi¤erence condition that the loss bid in round
k by a type x must be equal to the expected loss bid in round k + 1 that a type x would make if he made
a bid certain to lose in round k and discovered that round k winner has a type lower than x (see equation
(14) in Appendix A).
3.2 The Sequential Second-Price Auction
In the sequential second-price auction, in each round one object is sold to the highest bidder at a price
equal to the second highest bid. First, I will look at the case in which the winning bid is announced, as
in the case of a sequential rst-price auction. Then I will analyze the case in which the winning price
is announced. In a sequential second-price auction, announcing the bids of winners is not equivalent to
announcing the winning prices.
Theorem 2 On the equilibrium path of the symmetric equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction
with winning bid announcements, the bidding functions are
S2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
:
If there are no informational externalities, the bidding functions can be written as
S2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 
S2
k (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = x
i
:
Given the history of the past winning types, in the last round a bidder of type x submits a loss bid equal
to what he would value the object if he won and were pivotal. With no informational externalities, this
loss bid reduces to the expected value of the object to the bidder: Bids in a round k before the last follow
from the indi¤erence condition that, conditional on being pivotal in round k; a bidder must be indi¤erent
between winning in round k or in round k + 1 (see equation (22) Appendix A).
Consider now the case in which the winning prices are announced after each bidding round. With no
informational externalities, the equilibrium bidding functions in the sequential second-price auction are
the same as when the winning bids are announced.
Theorem 3 When there are no informational externalities, on the equilibrium path of the symmetric
equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with announcement of the winning prices, the bidding
functions can be written as
S2pk (x; yk 1; :::; y2) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = x
i
:
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This theorem can be understood as follows. Without informational externalities, equilibrium bids do
not depend on the past history of bids, no matter whether the winning bids, or the winning prices, are
announced. In both cases, in the last round it is a dominant strategy to place a loss bid equal to the items
value. The bids in earlier rounds are then determined recursively, via the indi¤erence condition (22).
History does not matter because in each round k a bidder bids as if he were pivotal (i.e., as if Y (N 1)k = x):
When, on the other hand, there are informational externalities and the winning price is revealed in
each round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does
not exist. The reason is simple: a bidder who, based on the history of prices, knows that he will lose in
round k, but will almost certainly win in round k + 1, has an incentive to deviate and make a very low
bid in round k. By doing so he will avoid being the price setter in round k: The price setter in round k
will be a bidder with a lower type, and hence in round k + 1 all other bidders (including the future price
setter) will have lower estimates of an objects conditional value and will make lower bids. As a result, the
deviating bidder will prot by winning at a lower price in round k+1. This is made clear by the following
simple example.
Example 1.
There are four bidders, three objects, and the common value of an object is V = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4.
Without loss of generality, let x1 > x2 > x3 > x4 (bidders, of course, only know their own signals). Suppose
there exists an increasing equilibrium. Then bidder 1 wins the rst round and announcing the price reveals
x2, the signal of bidder 2. Suppose x3 = x2   ", with " arbitrarily small. At the beginning of the
second round, bidder 3 knows that if he bids according to the equilibrium strategy, then with probability
arbitrarily closeto 1 he will be the price setter in round 2 and win an object in round 3. The price he
will pay in round 3 is the bid of bidder 4. Since this is the last round, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
bidder 4 to bid b =  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + x3 + x4) (recall that x2 and x3 have been revealed by the price
announcements, but x1 has not). Now consider a deviation by bidder 3 in round 2; suppose he bids zero.
Then the price setter in round 2 is bidder 4 and his signal is revealed. In round 3 bidder 4s weakly dominant
bid is bb =  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + 2x4), since bidder 4 assumes he is pivotal; that is, he assumes x3 = x4.
After having deviated in round 2, in round 3 bidder 3s weakly dominant strategy is to use a loss bid equal
to the conditional expected value of the object; that is, he will bid  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + x3 + x4). It
follows that by deviating bidder 3 will win in the third round and pay a price bb which is less than the price
b he would pay if he followed the equilibrium strategy. Hence we have a contradiction; bidder 3 of type
x3 = x2   " has a protable deviation in round 2 from the supposed increasing equilibrium.
4 The Afternoon E¤ect
In this section I show that declining prices (i.e., the afternoon e¤ect) are a natural consequence of aversion
to price risk, when there are no informational externalities.
Theorem 4 When there are no informational externalities, the price sequences in a sequential rst-price
and in a sequential second-price auction are a supermartingale.
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Proof. The proofs for both cases follow the same logic. Note that if there are no informational externalities,
then announcing either the winning bids or prices has no direct e¤ect on the bidding functions. Consider
rst a sequential rst-price auction. Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. Then it must be
Y
(N 1)
k  x  yk 1 < ::: < y1. It follows that PS1k = S1k (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1
i
and
E

PS1k+1jPS1k

= E

PS1k+1jS1k (x)

= E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )jY (N 1)k  x = Xi  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
= E
h


`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x = Xi  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
< 

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x = Xi  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
= 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k  x = Xi  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
= S1k (x)
= PS1k ;
where the inequality follows from Jensens inequality, given that  is a concave function. This shows that
the price sequence in a sequential rst-price auction is a supermartingale.
Consider now a sequential second-price auction. Suppose in round k the winner is the bidder with
signal Y (N 1)k ; and bidder i of type x is the price setter; that is, P
S2
k = 
S2
k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 
S2
k (x) =


E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = x
i
. In round k + 1, bidder i of type x wins the auction, and the price setter is
the bidder with the signal Y (N 1)k+1 . It follows that
E

PS2k+1jPS2k

= E

PS2k+1jS2k (x)

= E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )jY (N 1)k = x
i
= E
h


`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )

jY (N 1)k = x
i
< 

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )

jY (N 1)k = x
i
= 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K )jY (N 1)k = x
i
= S2k (x)
= PS2k :
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a supermartingale.
The intuition for the afternoon e¤ect is essentially the same in a rst-price and a second-price sequential
auction. In each round before the last, conditional on having the highest remaining type and being the
price setter, a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning now and winning in the next round.3 But if a
bidder is the price setter, then he knows the current price, while next rounds price is random. Because of
3 In a sequential rst-price auction, if a bidder has the highest signal in round k and he bids according to the equilbrium
bidding function, then he is automatically the price setter. On the other hand in a sequential second-price auction, conditioning
on the highest-signal bidder also being the price setter amounts to requiring that his signal is tied with the signal of another
bidder (i.e., the bidder is pivotal).
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aversion to price risk, next rounds expected price must then be lower than the price now. The di¤erence is
the risk premium the bidder must receive to be indi¤erent between the certain price now and the random
price in the next round.
To understand this intuition in more detail, consider round k < K of the second-price auction. Suppose
type x of bidder i has lost all preceding auctions. Suppose also that in round k bidder x considers raising
his bid by a small amount " above S2k (x). This will only make a di¤erence if, after the deviation, he wins
in round k, while he would have otherwise lost and won in round k + 1. For this to happen, it must be
that Y (N 1)k ' x; that is, we must be in the event in which bidder i with signal x is at the margin between
winning and losing in round k (i.e., he must be pivotal, his signal must be tied with the signal of another
bidder). Conditional on this event, the marginal cost of the deviation is the loss incurred in period k when
bidding according to the deviation,
`(S2k (x) + ");
while the marginal benet is the expected loss avoided in period k + 1;
E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ))jY (N 1)k ' Xi = x  Y (N 1)k 1 )
i
:
Equating marginal cost and marginal benet (and sending " to zero) gives the following indi¤erence con-
dition (see equation (22) in Appendix A):
`(S2k (x)) = E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ))jY (N 1)k = Xi = x)
i
:
The indi¤erence condition says that the certain loss when winning in period k at a price S2k (x) must be
equal to the expected loss when winning in period k + 1. Since bidders are averse to price risk, it must
then be the case that the expected price in round k + 1 is less than the price S2k (x) in round k: For the
marginal bidder to be indi¤erent between winning at a certain price now, or at an uncertain price in the
next round, it must be the case that the next rounds expected price (conditional on the current price) is
lower than the current price. Hence prices must decline from one period to the next.
Now consider a sequential rst-price auction. Suppose bidder i wins in round k if he bids as a type
x; that is, suppose Y (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 : Bidder i can also always bid so low so as to lose in round k.
With a losing bid, bidder i discovers the value of Y (N 1)k (the signal of the winner when bidder i bids low).
Bidder i can then win for sure in round k + 1 by bidding S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ) (i.e., by bidding as if his type
were Y (N 1)k ). The indi¤erence condition for sequential rst-price auctions states that bidder i must be
indi¤erent between winning in round k and in round k + 1 (see equation (14) in Appendix A):
`(S1k (x)) = E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1
i
:
The left hand side is the certain loss associated with the period k price; the right hand side is the expected
loss associated with the random price in period k+ 1. Thus the price sequence must also be decreasing in
a sequential rst-price auction.
10
5 The E¤ect of Informational Externalities
In order to focus on the e¤ect of informational externalities on the price sequence, it is best to look rst
at the standard risk neutral model (i.e., the case when ` is the identity function). I will show that when
bidders are neutral with respect to price risk, and there are informational externalities, prices increase
along the equilibrium path of a sequential auction with bid announcements. It is a bit of a surprise that
this result, which applies to the standard model with risk neutral bidders and independent signals, does
not seem to have appeared in previous literature. An increasing price sequence has only been derived in
the model with a¢ liated signals by Milgrom and Weber (1982) (see also Mezzetti et al., 2008).
Theorem 5 In a sequential rst-price and in a sequential second-price auction with announcement of the
winning bids, if bidders are risk neutral and there are informational externalities, then the price sequence
is a submartingale.
Proof. Recall that ` and  coincide with the identity function. Consider rst a sequential rst-price
auction. Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. It must be Y (N 1)k  x < yk 1 < ::: < y1,
and PS1k = 
S1
k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
: It
follows that
E

PS1k+1jPS1k

= E

PS1k+1jS1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1)

= E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::; y1)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
 E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::; y1)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
= E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
= S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)
= PS1k ;
where the inequality follows from S1k+1() being an increasing function of all its arguments and Y (N 1)k  x.
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential rst-price auction is a submartingale.
Now consider a sequential second-price auction. Suppose that in round k the winner is the bidder
with signal Y (N 1)k , and bidder i of type x is the price setter; that is, P
S2
k = 
S2
k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) =
E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
: In round k + 1, bidder i of type x
wins the auction, and the price setter is the bidder with signal Y (N 1)k+1 . It follows that
E

PS2k+1jPS2k

= E

PS2k+1jS2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)

= E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; :::
i
 E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x = Y (N 1)k ; :::
i
= E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k = X1 = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
= S2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)
= PS2k :
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Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a submartingale.
The conventional wisdom that with independent signals and risk neutral bidders the price sequence is a
martingale is only correct if there are no informational externality (i.e., in the common terminology, values
are private). With informational externalities, prices tend to increase from one round to the next. To see
why, consider a sequential second-price auction (the reasoning for a rst-price auction is similar). As we
argued in the previous section, a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning in the current round and
winning in the next round, conditional on having the highest remaining signal and being the price setter.
With risk neutral bidders, this implies that the current price must be equal to the expected price in the
next round conditional on the event E that the current winner has the same signal as the price setter. With
informational externalities, the next round expected price conditional on the event E is an underestimate
of the next round expected price conditional on the current price. This is because the current winner will
generally have a higher signal than the current price setter, and the value of an object directly depends in
a positive way on the signals of all bidders.
It is useful to stress that the intuition behind the result in Milgrom and Weber (1982) that the price
sequence is increasing when signals are a¢ liated random variables is similar to the intuition behind Theorem
5. With a¢ liated signals, the expected value of an object depends in a positive way on the signals of all
bidders, and it is also the case that the current price is equal to an underestimate of the price in the next
round (see Mezzetti et al., 2008, for a discussion).
6 Aversion to Price Risk and Informational Externalities: E¤ect De-
composition
While aversion to price risk pushes prices to decline over time, informational externalities introduce a ten-
dency for prices to increase. If bidders are both averse to price risk and there are informational externalities,
it is possible to decompose the two countervailing e¤ects on the price sequence.
Given a bid loss `; since ` ((`)) = `, we can think of (`) as the implicit price associated with `;
if a bidder pays a price (`); his loss is equal to `:
Consider round k + 1 of a sequential rst-price auction, after the winnerssignal history x; yk 1; :::; y1.
(Note that the bidder with signal x is also the price setter in round k:) The round k + 1 aversion to price
risk e¤ect is dened as the di¤erence between the expected price and the implicit price associated with the
expected loss in round k + 1; conditional on the signal history x; yk 1; :::; y1:
AS1k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
  

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
Since  is a concave function, when bidders are averse to price risk the implicit price associated with the
expected loss is higher than the expected price; the aversion to price risk e¤ect is negative, AS1k+1() < 0. If
bidders are risk neutral, AS1k+1() = 0.
The informational externality e¤ect is dened as the increase in the implicit price in round k + 1 due
to the winning bidder in round k having signal x  Y (N 1)k , rather than the same signal Y (N 1)k as the
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winner in round k + 1; conditional on the signal history x; yk 1; :::; y1:
IS1k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
  

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
:
If there are informational externalities IS1k+1() > 0, because S1k+1, is an increasing function of all its
variables; the informational externality e¤ect is positive. If there are no informational externalities, bids
do not depend on the signals of past winners and so the implicit price in round k + 1 does not depend on
the signal of the winning bidder in round k; hence IS1k+1() = 0:
The aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality e¤ect in a sequential second-price
auction are dened as in the case of a rst-price auction, except that conditioning now is on the event that
in round k the winner is the bidder with signal Y (N 1)k , that bidder i of type x is the price setter, and that
the previous rounds winnerssignals are yk 1; :::; y1:
AS2k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; ::
i
  

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)j

jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; ::
i
:
IS2k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)j

jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; ::
i
  

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)j

jY (N 1)k = x
i
:
The next theorem, whose proof is in Appendix A, shows that in both sequential auctions the expected
price in round k + 1, conditional on the price in round k; is equal to the sum of the price in round k, the
aversion to price risk e¤ect, and the informational externality e¤ect.
Theorem 6 Suppose the price setter in round k has signal x and the history of winners signals up to
round k   1 is yk 1; :::; y1: In the sequential rst-price auction (j = 1) and the sequential second-price
auction (j = 2) with announcement of the winning bids we have:
E
h
PSjk+1jPSjk
i
= PSjk +A
Sj
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
Sj
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1):
7 A Calibrated Example
Can aversion to price risk explain the declining price sequences we observe in the data? What is the
degree of aversion to price risk that is needed? May prices decline even with informational externalities?
This section provides some answers to these questions. I introduce a simple parametric example, and
show that its predictions match the data from a sample of empirical studies, for reasonable specications
of the parameters. The empirical reference points for the discussion in this section are the papers of
Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1993) on sequential (mostly two-round) auctions of identical
bottles of wine sold in equal lot sizes. Ashenfelters (1989) data set included auctions between August
1985 and December 1987 in four di¤erent location (Christiess London and Chicago, Sothebys London and
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Butterselds San Francisco). McAfee and Vincent (1993) looked at auctions held at Christiess in Chicago
in 1987. They both found evidence of declining prices; the price in the second auction was twice more
likely to decrease than to increase. The average price ratio P2=P 1 they found is displayed in Figure 1.
Mean Ratio P2=P1
Ashenfelter (1989): Christiess London .9943
Ashenfelter (1989): Sothebys London .9875
Ashenfelter (1989): Christiess Chicago .9884
Ashenfelter (1989): Butterelds San Francisco .9663
McAfee and Vincent (1993): Christiess Chicago .9922
Figure 1: Price ratio in the data
I will make the following simplifying assumptions to the model. The value of an object to bidder i is
xi + b
P
j 6=i xj ; with b 2 [0; 1]: If b = 0, there are no informational externalities. The random variables Xi
are distributed on [0; 1] with distribution function F (x) = xa; with a > 0: The loss function is:
`(p) =
p1+r
1 + r
;
We can interpret r = p`00=`0 as a coe¢ cient of relative price-risk aversion. The inverse of ` is
(z) = (1 + r)
1
1+r z
1
1+r :
I will restrict attention to the second-price auction and the case of two rounds, K = 2. In Appendix B, I
compute the bidding functions, the expected price in round 2 conditional on the rst-round price P1; and
the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the rst-round price.
In all computations reported in this section, I will set r = 2, a commonly used value for relative risk
aversion in computational macroeconomics (e.g., see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000); it implies that a bidder
is willing to pay a price about 1% higher to avoid a 50-50 gamble of a 10% increase or a 10% decrease in
price. The results do not seem overly sensitive to the value of r.
If we rst postulate that in the auctions in question there were no informational externalities, that is
b = 0, then the price ratio is (see (27)):
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
(a(N   2)) r1+r (a (N   2) + 1) 11+r
a(N   2) + 11+r
 : (1)
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We can use (1) to graph the price ratio E [P2jP1] =P1 as a function of A = a(N   2):
Figure 2: Price ratio with no informational externalities as a function of A = a(N   2)
The average price ratio in the data in Figure 1 ranges from 0:9663 to 0:9943, which correspond to values
of A from 1:3903 to 3:9788. In most of the auctions considered the number of bidders was relatively small,
typically well below 20. If we take N = 10, this gives values of a between 0:1738 and 0:4973 as those
consistent with the data.
Suppose now that there are informational externalities, b > 0: In this case E[P2jP1]P1 depends on the type
x of the rst-round price setter. Appendix B reports the expected value of the price ratio E
h
E[P2jP1]
P1
i
:
With informational externalities, lower values of the parameter a are needed to match the data. Setting
r = 2 as before, N = 10, and a = 0:1 yields the relationship between the price ratio and the informational
externality parameter b shown in Figure 3. The range of the average price ratio in the data in Figure 1
corresponds to values of the informational externality parameter between 0:0827 and 0:1260. Prices may
decline even if there are informational externalities. In fact, the presence of both aversion to price risk and
informational externalities could help explaining why in some auctions prices decline and in other they
increase; it could also help explaining why in some multiple round auctions prices decline between some
15
rounds and increase between other rounds (e.g. see Jones et al. 2004).
Figure 3: Price ratio as a function of the information externality parameter b
8 Extensions
In this section, I show that the aversion to price risk e¤ect is present even when bidders demand multiple
units, or the auction format is an oral ascending auction. While I do not prove it formally, if I allowed for
informational externalities, the informational externality e¤ect would also be present in these extensions.
8.1 Multi-Unit Demand
New issues and serious complications arise in models with multi-unit demand, which are generally not very
tractable (e.g., see Milgrom, 2004). To keep the focus on the e¤ect of aversion to price risk in a tractable
model, in this subsection I extend Katzmans (1999) model of a two-round, second-price auction with no
informational externalities.
I assume that each bidder extracts two values from the same distribution F . If xh is the highest and xl
the lowest value extracted, then bidder i obtains a payo¤ of xh   `(pk) if he only wins one object in round
k at price pk, and a payo¤ of xh+xl  `(p1)  `(p2) if he wins two objects at prices p1 and p2: In Katzman
(1999), ` is the identity function, and hence bidders are risk neutral.
The proof of the following theorem is in Appendix C.
Theorem 7 On the equilibrium path of the two-round, second-price auction with multi-unit demand and
no informational externalities, the bidding functions are
S22

xh; xljxh > Y (2N 2)1

= (xl)
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S22

xh; xljxh < Y (2N 2)1

= (xh)
S21 (xh; xl) = 

E
h
Y
(2N 2)
2 jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
:
The auction is e¢ cient, the bidder or bidders with the two highest marginal valuations win the objects.
In the second round, the loss bid is equal to the bidders value for the object, which is equal to xl if the
bidder won in the rst round and to xh if he did not. In the rst round, the loss bid is equal to the expected
second highest value of a bidders opponents, conditional on the highest value of the bidders opponents
being equal to the bidders highest value. A bidder behaves as if he is only going to win an object, and his
bid is selected so as to make him indi¤erent between winning in the rst or in the second round.
Suppose that the rst-round price setter is bidder i of type (xh; xl); the bidder with the highest value
among bidder is opponents won the rst round. There are two possible events. The rst event is that
the rst-round price setter, bidder i, wins the second round auction. In this case the expected second
round price is the expected bid associated with the second highest value of bidder is opponents; that is,
E
h
(Y
(2N 2)
2 )jY (2N 2)2  xh
i
, which is equal to E
h
(Y
(2N 2)
2 )jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
, because of the indepen-
dence of signals. This rst event has probability PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg; the conditional probability
that the rst-round winner has a marginal value for the second object lower than xh: The second event is
that the rst-round winner also wins the second auction, and hence the rst-round price setter also sets
the price in the second round; in this case the expected second round price is (xh). This event happens
with probability PrfY (2)2 > xhjY (2)1 > xhg: It follows that, conditional on bidder i of type (xh; xl) being
the rst-round price setter, the second round expected price is:
E [P2jP1] = E
h


Y
(2N 2)
2

jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg+ (xh) PrfY (2)2 > xhjY (2)1 > xhg:
(2)
Dene the aversion to price risk e¤ect as:
AS22 (xh) =
n
E
h


Y
(2N 2)
2

jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
  

E
h
Y
(2N 2)
2 jY (2N 2)1 = xh
io
PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg
=
n
E
h


Y
(2N 2)
2

jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
  S21 (xh; xl)
o
PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg: (3)
The aversion to price risk e¤ect is the di¤erence between the expected price and the implicit price associated
with the expected loss in round 2; conditional on the rst-round price setter winning the second round
auction, multiplied by the probability that the rst-round price-setter wins in the second round.
Dene the multi-unit demand e¤ect as:
MS22 (xh) =

(xh)  S21 (xh; xl)

PrfY (2)2 > xhjY (2)1 > xhg: (4)
The multi-unit demand e¤ect measures the e¤ect on the price sequence of the same bidder winning both
rounds. It is the di¤erence between the second-round price and the rst-round price, conditional on the
rst-round price-setter being the price setter also in the second round, multiplied by the probability that
the rst-round and second-round price setters are the same bidder, which implies that the same bidder
wins both rst and second round.
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While the aversion to price risk e¤ect is non-positive, the multi-unit demand e¤ect is non-negative.4
As the next theorem shows, whether the price sequence in a two-round second-price auction with no
informational externalities is decreasing depends on whether the aversion to price risk e¤ect dominates the
multi-unit demand e¤ect (the proof is in Appendix C).
Theorem 8 Suppose that the price setter in the rst round has signals (xh; xl): Then the expected second
round price in the two-round, second-price auction with multi-unit demand and no informational external-
ities is:
E [P2jP1] = P1 +AS22 (xh) +MS22 (xh)
Consider the example with F (x) = xa and `(p) = p1+r=(1 + r) introduced in Section 7. Appendix
C computes the bidding functions, the expected price in round 2 and the conditional price ratio: Letting
r = 2 and N = 10; as in Section 7, Figure 4 graphs the expected price ratio as a function of a: The average
price ratio in the data in Figure 1 ranges from 0:9663 to 0:9943. This corresponds to values of a ranging
from 0:0728 to 0:1897: Aversion to price risk may generate declining prices even if bidders have multi-unit
demand.
Figure 4: Price ratio as a function of a
8.2 The English Auction
Sequential auctions are often run using an English, or oral ascending, format. The fundamental di¤erence
between an English format and a sealed bid auction is that in the former information endogenously accrues
to bidders in the course of each round of play. The main issue with analyzing sequential English auctions
4Katzman (1999) showed that with risk neutral bidders the price sequence is increasing.
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is to nd a formal model that is tractable and captures the information ow during the auction. The most
commonly used model to study a static, single unit, English auction is the so-called Japanese version, in
which a price clock moves continuously and bidders can only decide when to quit. Once a bidder quits, he
cannot re-enter. When the second to last bidder quits, the clock stops and the last bidder standing wins
at the current clock price. The main virtue of such an auction format is its simplicity. In the case of no
informational externalities and risk neutral bidders, for example, it is a dominant strategy to quit when the
price reaches ones value for the item. Using the Japanese format for sequential auctions is problematic.
As Milgrom and Weber (1982) rst pointed out, the equilibrium is the same as in the static English auction
for multiple items. Consider for example the case of two objects, no informational externalities and risk
neutral bidders. In the rst round, it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to drop out at their value for
the object if there are more than two bidders remaining, and to drop out immediately after the third to last
bidder has dropped out. Thus, the price in the rst round is equal to the third highest bidders valuation.
This is also the price that prevails in the second, and last, round. The price is the same in all rounds; in
fact, a sequential Japanese auction is outcome equivalent to a static, multi-unit, Japanese auction. This
is because the Japanese format forces all losing bidders to reveal their types during the rst round. At
the time the rst round price is determined, all that is needed to determine prices in all rounds has been
revealed. This is true independently of whether bidders are risk neutral or averse to price risk; aversion to
price risk cannot lead to decreasing prices because bidders face no price risk!
Such a counterintuitive conclusion is a by-product of the extreme nature of the Japanese format. In
practical ascending auctions, it is not the case that at the end of the rst round all bidders in the room
know the identity of all future winners and the types of all losing bidders. Bidders often stay silent at the
beginning and only start bidding towards the end of a round. Some bidders stay silent throughout a round,
and it is not at all clear what their values are. When bidders are allowed to decide how much information
to reveal in the course of bidding, the analysis can be unwieldy. In this subsection, I will introduce a format
of an ascending auction that is tractable, and allows bidders to hide their values during a round. The only
point I want to make is that the afternoon e¤ect is still present, as long as bidders in the early rounds are
uncertain, at the time price is determined, about the valuation of some of their opponents (allowing for
the probability of entry of new bidders in the second round would serve the same purpose).
I will assume that there are only two rounds and that there are no informational externalities. Bidders
are averse to price risk and have unit demand. In each round of the auction, the auctioneer calls bidders
to increase the current price by a xed increment  (I will let  go to zero). If one or more bidders raise
the price, then the bidder with the lowest label is selected as the new high bidder at the new price (the
tie breaking rule is not important). If no bidder raises the price, then the auctioneer makes a second call,
at the same price. If one or more bidders raises after the second call, then, as before, the bidder with the
lowest label becomes the new high bidder. If no bidder raises after the second call, then the round ends
and the current high bidder wins an object at the current price.
This sequential ascending auction format has an equilibrium in which only two bidders are initially
active (say bidder 1 and bidder 2), in the rst round. When one of the two active bidders does not raise
the other active bidders o¤er, then all other bidders enter the bidding (raise the current price) if it is
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protable for them to do so. Such an equilibrium has declining prices between rounds. This is because in
the rst round, when deciding to stop raising the price, the two initially active bidders are uncertain about
the other biddersvaluations, and hence next round price. The uncertainty is due to all other bidders not
being active in the early stages of the rst round of the auction. The intuition for the occurrence of an
afternoon e¤ect is the same as in the case of a second-price auction. Bidders 1 and 2 are willing to pay a
premium to insure themselves against a future uncertain price.
The proof of the following theorem is in Appendix C.
Theorem 9 There is an equilibrium of the two-round, English auction, with no informational externalities,
in which: 1) In the second round, each remaining bidder i answers the rst call by raising the price if and
only if he is not the current winner and the current price is below E2 (xi) = (xi): 2) In the rst round,
bidder i = 1; 2 answers the rst call and raises bidder j = 1; 2; j 6= i; current winning price if and only if
the current price is below E1E(xi) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
2 jY (N 1)1 = xi
i
and no other bidder has yet entered the
bidding (i.e., ever raised the price). After a bidder di¤erent from 1 and 2 has entered the bidding for the
rst time, then bidder i raises the current winning price if and only if he is not the current winner and
the current winning price is below E1L(xi) = (xi): 3) In the rst round, bidder i 6= 1; 2 does not enter
the bidding as long as bidders 1 and 2 are raising each other prices. If one of bidders 1; 2 does not answer
the rst-call to raise current price p   , then bidder i answer the second call and raises if and only if
p < (xi); after raising the price once, bidder i continues raising the price as long as he is not the current
winner and the current winning price is below (xi).
The winners of the auction are the two highest valuation bidders. There are two possible outcomes.
First, all bidders become active in the rst round. In this case, the prices in the rst and in the second
round are the same and equal to (Y (N)3 ); the types of all losing bidders will become known by the end of
in the rst round. This is the same outcome that would obtain in the equilibrium of the Japanese auction.
The second possible outcome is that only bidder 1 and bidder 2 are active in the rst round. This can
happen only if they are the two highest valuation bidders. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
bidder 1 has the highest valuation. Then the rst round price is P1 = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
2 jY (N 1)1 = x2
i
. The
expected second round price, conditional on P1, is E [P2jP1] = E
h


Y
(N 1)
2

jY (N 1)1 = x2
i
; by Jensens
inequality, it is E [P2jP1] < P1. Since the second outcome will occur with strictly positive probability, we
have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 10 The price sequence of the two-round English auction with no informational externalities is
a supermartingale.
9 Conclusions
The classic model of risk neutral bidders assumes additive separability in a bidders preferences over objects
and money. Aversion to price risk maintains additive separability, but postulates that a bidder prefers a
certain price to an equivalent (on average) random price. Additive separability of preferences makes the
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model very tractable. As I show in Lemma 11 in Appendix A, it implies that a bidder-payo¤ equivalence
theorem holds. All auction mechanisms with the same allocation rule and which give the same payo¤ to
the lowest bidder type are bidder-payo¤ equivalent.
Without additive separability, the e¤ects due to aversion to price risk, aversion to quantity risk, and
private information interact. The interaction between (price and quantity) risk aversion and private in-
formation in a single-sale model is the focus of Maskin and Riley (1984). McAfee and Vincent (1993)
showed that sequential auctions without additive separability are not very tractable; equilibrium in their
two-round, second-price auction with no informational externalities is in mixed strategies.
Aversion to price risk yields a simple explanation of declining prices in sequential auctions. In any given
round, a small change in his own bid matters to a bidder only if it is, at the same time, the winning bid
and the price setting bid. Thus, when his own bid matters, a bidder wins at a certain price, his own bid.
Optimality requires that there is no rst order e¤ect on the bidders payo¤ of a change in the bid. This
implies that the bidder is indi¤erent between winning in the current round or in the next round. Since next
round prince is random, in e¤ect the bidder buys price insurance in the current round to protect himself
against future price randomness.
The paper also uncovers an informational externality e¤ect. When there is no aversion to price risk,
but there are informational externalities, prices increase between rounds of sequential auctions. Again, the
explanation is simple. The current price setting bidder must be indi¤erent between winning in the current
or in the next round, assuming that he is also the current winner; that is, he must be indi¤erent between
the current price (which he sets) and his estimate of the next round price. Since he assumes that he is
also the current winner, the current price setter underestimates the signal of his highest opponent and true
winner of the current round. Because of informational externalities, this amounts to underestimating next
round price. Hence, on average next round price is higher than the current price.
Several empirical implications can be drawn from this paper. First, the more important a concern is
price risk for bidders, the more we should expect prices to decline between rounds. Thus, for example, if
there is a serious possibility that new bidders may enter in the next round, then price risk is more severe
and we should expect prices to decline more.
Second, when informational externalities, or value interdependencies, are not very important, but
bidders are averse to price risk, then prices are likely to decline. When value interdependencies are more
important than price risk, then we should expect prices to increase between rounds. For example, if the
auctioneer publishes all the information at his disposal (as the professional auction houses typically do),
including value estimates of the objects for sale, then interdependencies are reduces and it is more likely
that we see prices decline (as the data broadly suggests), rather than increase between rounds. If bidders
are professionals, buying the goods for resale, and little information is provided about resale value by the
auctioneer before the auction, then it is more likely that prices will increase between rounds.5
Third, when bidders have multi-unit demand, so, for example, if the same bidder wins multiple rounds,
5This seems broadly consistent with Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2005) study of an auction of rare library books, in which
price estimates were not published and a lower bound on the number of professionals in the auction is estimated by the authors
at about 25%.
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then it is more likely that prices only decline moderately, or even increase, between rounds.6
Fourth, the less information about biddersvalues transpires during a round, the more we should expect
prices to decline. Thus, if each round is an oral ascending auction, the larger the number of bidders that
remain silent during the initial rounds, the higher future price randomness, and hence the more likely are
prices to decline between rounds.
More generally, the interaction between the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality
e¤ect could help to explain the more complex price paths we sometimes observe in the data.
6This seems consistent with the ndings in Jones et al. (2004).
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Appendix A
This appendix contains the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 6. First, it is it is useful to derive a lemma
showing that bidderspayo¤s are the same in every auction having the same outcome function and yielding
the same payo¤ to the lowest type of bidder.
Suppose that k objects have already been sold to the k highest type bidders, y1; :::; yk; suppose also
that the winnerstypes have been revealed. Consider a mechanism in which k+1(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) is is
probability of winning one of the remaining objects and pk+1(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) is is payment when he
behaves as a type x0: Then, bidder is expected payo¤ when his type is x; but he behaves as if his type
were x0 is
Uk+1(x
0;x; yk; :::; y1) =
Z yk
x
:::
Z yN 2
x

V (x; yN 1; :::; y1)i(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) 
`(pi(x
0
i; yN 1; :::; yk+1))

f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jY (N 1)k = yk)dyN 1:::dyk+1;
where f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jyk) is the density of the order statistics Y (N 1)N 1 ; :::; Y (N 1)k+1 conditional on Y (N 1)k =
yk. (By independence, it is not necessary to condition on the order statistics Y
(N 1)
h with h < k:)
Letting Uk+1(x; yk; :::; y1) = Uk+1(x;x; yk; :::; y1) be the expected payo¤ in equilibrium of type x, and
using a standard envelope argument yields
@Uk+1(x; yk; :::; y1)
@x
(5)
=
Z yk
x
:::
Z yN 2
x
@V (x; yN 1; :::; y1)
@x
i(x; yN 1; :::; yk+1)f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jY (N 1)k = yk)dyN 1:::dyk+1:
In particular, if the mechanism is e¢ cient, as the sequential auctions studied in this paper, then (5) becomes
@Uk+1(x; yk; ::; y1)
@x
= E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; yk; ::; y1)
@x
x > Y (N 1)K
#
FK(xjY (N 1)k = yk): (6)
Equation (5), combined with Uk+1(x; :::) = u, yields the bidder-payo¤ equivalence lemma.
Lemma 11 Suppose k = 0; :::;K   1 objects have already been sold to the highest type bidders, and the
winning types have been announced. Bidderspayo¤s are the same in any mechanism hk+1; pk+1i having
the same outcome function k+1 and yielding the same payo¤ to the lowest type. Equation (5) (equation
(6) if the mechanism is e¢ cient) and the boundary condition Uk+1(x; :::) = u determine a bidders payo¤.
We are now ready to prove Theorems 1-3
Proof of Theorem 1. Let S1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Recall that,
assuming that S1k is increasing in x; on the equilibrium path the true types of the winning bidders are
revealed. Suppose that if the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all
bidders believes that the winning bidders type is the same as the type of the previous rounds winner;
if the observed winning bid in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the
winners type is the lowest possible type.
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Let Uk (x; yk 1; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder in the continuation equilibrium begin-
ning in round k (i.e., the payo¤ conditional on having lost all previous auctions and on the history up to
round k). In writing a bidders payo¤, I will use the function vk, dened as follows:
vk(x; yk; :::; y1) = E
h
V (Xi; X i)jXi = x; Y (N 1)k = yk; :::; Y (N 1)1 = y1
i
: (7)
Suppose that all the other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating
in round k (only). First note that, given his beliefs, it is not protable for bidder i to bid above the highest
possible bid of the other bidders S1k (yk 1; ). Bidding below the lowest possible bid is equivalent to bidding
the lowest bid; in both cases winning is a zero probability event. Hence if there is a protable deviation,
there is a protable deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. The payo¤ of bidder i of type x
when he bids b = S1k (z; yk 1; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in round k is:
Uk(z;x; yk 1; :::) =
Z z
x

vk(x; yk; :::)  `(S1k (z; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk (8)
+
Z x
z
Uk+1(x; yk; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the rst order condition
vk(x; z; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (z; yk 1; :::))F
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dz
(9)
  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Since on the equilibrium path it is x  yk 1; and z = x must be optimal, we obtain the following necessary
condition for equilibrium:
vk(x; x; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (x; yk 1; ::))F
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dx
(10)
  Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Observe that if the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal
x wins with probability 1; hence, it is
Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; x; yk 1; :::)  `(S1k+1(x;x; yk 1; :::)): (11)
Since UK+1(x;x; yK 1; ::; ) = 0; equation (11) also holds for k = K, provided we dene
S1K+1(x;x; yK 1; :::) =  (vK(x; x; yK 1; :::)) : (12)
Using (11), equation (10) can be written as
`(S1k+1(x;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (x; ))F (N 1)k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dx
= 0: (13)
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Integrating (13) we obtain
`(S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)) =
Z x
x
`
 
S1k+1(ex; ex; yk 1; ::; y1) f (N 1)k
exjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
F
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
dex (14)
= E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
i
:
By (12), for k = K, this yields
`(S1K (x; yK 1; :::)) = E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; yK 1; :::)jY (N 1)K  x  Y (N 1)K 1 = yK 1
i
:
Working backwards, (14) yields
`(S1k (x; yk 1; :::)) = E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
;
and hence on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy
S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) = 

E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
i
:
(15)
Note from (15) that if values are private V (Y (N 1)K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::) = Y
(N 1)
K , and 
S1
k is indepen-
dent of y1; :::; yk 1.
It remains to show that if all bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy in the rounds after k, and
if in round k all other bidders follow the bidding strategy S1k dened in (15), then it is also optimal for
bidder i to follow it. Using (10) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (9) we obtain
@Uk
@z
= [vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)] f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(16)
+

Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

:
Since vk is increasing in x and UK+1 = 0; for k = K the sign of
@Uk
@z is the same as x   z; hence z = x is
optimal.
Now suppose k < K; take rst the case z  x. Note that
Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  `(S1k+1(z; z; yk 1; :::));
because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k, and bids S1k+1(minfx; zg; z; yk 1; :::) = S1k+1(z; z; yk 1; :::):
It follows that @Uk@z = 0 for z  x and bidder i has no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in
round k.
Now suppose that z > x. By Lemma 11, equation (6), we have
@Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
= E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
x > Y (N 1)K
#
FK(xjY (N 1)k = z)
< E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
#
=
@vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)
@x
: (17)
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Integrating between x and z, it follows that
Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) < vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(x; z; yk 1; :::);
and hence that @Uk@z < 0 for z > x; bidder i has no incentive to bid more than the equilibrium strategy in
round k. This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let S2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Suppose that if
the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all bidders believe that the
winning bidders type is the same as the type of the previous rounds winner; if the observed winning bid
in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the winners type is the lowest
possible type.
Let Uk (x; yk 1; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder at the beginning of round k. Suppose
that all the other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating in round
k. As for the case of a sequential rst-price auction, if there is a protable deviation, there is a protable
deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. Recalling (7), the payo¤ of bidder i of type x when he
bids b = S2k (z; yk 1; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in auction k can be written as:
Uk(z;x; yk 1; :::) =
Z z
x

vk(x; yk; :::)  `(S2k (yk; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk
+
Z x
z
Uk+1(x; yk; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the rst order condition
vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  `(S2k (z; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(18)
  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Since on the equilibrium path z = x must be optimal, the following is a necessary condition for equilibrium:
vk(x; x; yk 1; :::)  `(S2k (x; yk 1; :::))  Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = 0: (19)
If k = K; then Uk+1(x; ) = 0, and (19) yields that on the equilibrium path the bidding function must
satisfy
S2K (x; yK 1; :::; y1) =  (vK(x; x; yK 1; :::; y1)) (20)
= 

E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 :::)jY (N 1)K = x  Y (N 1)K 1 = yK 1; :::
i
:
If the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal x wins with
probability 1; hence, it is
Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; x; yk 1; :::) 
Z x
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = x

: (21)
Thus (19) can be written as
`(S2k (x; yk 1; :::)) =
Z x
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = x

(22)
= E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; :::))jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
:
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Recalling (20) and working backwards we obtain
`(S2k (x; yk 1; ::)) = E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
Thus, we have shown that on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy
S2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) = 

E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; ::)jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
: (23)
It only remains to show that if all bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy in the rounds after k,
and if in round k all other bidders follow the bidding strategy S2k dened in (23), then it is also optimal
for bidder i to follow it. Using (19) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (18) we
obtain
@Uk
@z
= [vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)] f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(24)
+

Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; :::)

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

:
Consider k = K; since vk is increasing in x and UK+1 = 0; the sign of
@UK
@z is the same as x  z; hence
z = x is optimal.
Now suppose k < K; take rst the case z  x. Note that
Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; z; yk 1; :::) 
Z z
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1; z; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = z

;
because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k: It follows that @Uk@z = 0 for z  x and bidder i has
no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in round k.
Now take the case z > x. As shown in (17), by Lemma 11, equation (6), we have
@Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; :::; y1)
@x
<
@vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)
@x
:
Integrating between x and z, it follows that
vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(x; z; yk 1; :::) > Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; );
and hence that @Uk@z < 0 for z > x; bidder i has no incentive to bid more than the equilibrium strategy in
round k. This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 3. As in a static second-price auction, it is clear that in round K bidding according
to the equilibrium strategy is a weakly dominant strategy; a bidder wins if and only if he obtains a positive
payo¤ and the price he pays does not depend on his bid.
Now consider round k < K; suppose that all the other bidders follow their equilibrium strategies, as
described in the theorem, while bidder i is considering deviating. Suppose rst that bidder i of type x is
the price setter in round k 1 and hence the bidder with the k-th highest signal (this implies that the k-th
highest signal among his N   1 opponents is less than, or equal to, x). Note rst that bidding as a type
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z > x yields the same payo¤ as bidding as a type x (he wins for sure). If he deviates in round k (only)
and bids as if he were a type z  x, he either wins in round k, or in round k + 1; he obtains a payo¤
x 
Z z
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = y
i
f
(N 1)
k

yjY (N 1)k  x

dy
 
Z x
z
Z y
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k+1 = t
i
f
(N 1)
k+1

tjY (N 1)k = y

dtf
(N 1)
k

yjY (N 1)k  x

dy:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields
  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = z
i
f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k  x

+
Z z
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k+1 = t
i
f
(N 1)
k+1

tjY (N 1)k = z

dtf
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k  x

;
which is equal to zero for all values of z. It follows that type x has no incentive to deviate in round k.
Now consider a type x < yk, the price setter in round k   1: If in round k he bids as if he were a type
z  yk, then he loses and obtains the same (expected, future) payo¤ independently of his bid. It follows
that he may as well bid as a type x; by equation (6), doing so gives him the (equilibrium) payo¤n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
; (25)
where Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
is the probability that Y (N 1)K < x conditional on Y
(N 1)
k = yk: If
type x bids in round k as if he were a type z = yk; then he ties with the round k winner and he may as
well raise his bid and win for sure, or lower his bid and lose for sure. If he bids above the bid of the yk
type, so that he wins for sure, type x obtains a payo¤
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = yk
i
=
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
+
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K  x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K  xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
<
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
:
It follows from (25) that it is not protable for a bidder of type x to deviate and bid more than a type yk.
This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a sequential rst-price auction, and suppose that the history of the
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winnerssignals up to round k is x; yk 1; :::; y1: Then we have:
E

PS1k+1jPS1k

= E

PS1k+1jS1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1)

= E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
= 

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
+AS1k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= 

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
+AS1k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= 

E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; ::

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; ::
i
+AS1k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) +A
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= PS1k +A
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S1
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1):
Now consider a sequential second-price auction. Suppose that in round k the winner is the bidder with
signal Y (N 1)k , and bidder i of type x is the price setter, while the history of the previous rounds winners
signals is yk 1; :::; y1: We have
E

PS2k+1jPS2k

= E

PS2k+1jS2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1)

= E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; ::
i
= 

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)j

jY (N 1)k+1  X1 = x  Y (N 1)k ; ::
i
+AS2k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= 

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)j

jY (N 1)k = x
i
+AS2k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= 

E
h
V (Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K 1 ; :::)jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
+AS2k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= S2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) +A
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1)
= PS2k +A
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
S2
k=1(x; yk 1; :::; y1):

Appendix B
In this appendix, I compute the bidding functions and price ratios for the example discussed in Section 7.
Recalling that
(z) = (1 + r)
1
1+r z
1
1+r ;
29
we can use Theorem 2 to calculate the bidding functions in the sequential second-price auction:
S22 (x; y1) = (1 + r)
1
1+r

by1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

x
 1
1+r
;
S21 (x) = (1 + r)
1
1+r

a (N   2)
a (N   2) + 1x+ b

x+ (N   2) a
a+ 1
x
 1
1+r
The expected price in round 2, conditional on the rst-round price P1 is:
E

P2jP1 = S21 (x)

= (1 + r)
1
1+r E
"
b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
1  xa +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

Y
(N 1)
2
 1
1+r
jY (N 1)2  x
#
= (1 + r)
1
1+r
Z x
0

b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
1  xa +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)z
a(N 2) 1
xa(N 2)
dz
= (1 + r)
1
1+r x
1
1+r
Z 1
0

b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
x  xa+1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
It follows that the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the rst-round price is:
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
R 1
0

b aa+1
1 xa+1
x xa+1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) aa+1b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1 + b

1 + (N   2) aa+1
 1
1+r
: (26)
In the case of no informational externalities, that is b = 0, this becomes:
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
R 1
0 z
1
1+r a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1
 1
1+r
=
(a(N   2)) r1+r (a (N   2) + 1) 11+r
a(N   2) + 11+r
 : (27)
If there are informational externalities, b > 0; E[P2jP1]P1 depends on the signal x of the rst-round price
setter. Since x is the value of the second order statistic out of N draws, the expected value of the price
ratio is
E

E [P2jP1]
P1

=
Z 1
0
R 1
0

b aa+1
1 xa+1
x xa+1 +

1 + ba+1 (1 + (N   2)a)

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1 + b

1 + (N   2) aa+1
 1
1+r
N(N   1)a (1  xa)xa(N 1) 1dx
Appendix C
In this appendix I prove the theorems for the multi-unit and English auction presented in Section 8. I
also compute the bidding functions, the expected price in round 2 and the conditional price ratio for a
30
multi-unit version of the example with F (x) = xa and `(p) = p1+r=(1 + r) introduced in Section 7. I start
with the multi-unit demand, sequential, second-price auction.
Proof of Theorem 7. In the second round, it is a weakly dominant strategy to submit a loss bid equal
to the objects value. Hence `(S22 ()) equals xl if the bidder won the rst round, and xh if the bidder lost.
Consider the rst round. Suppose all other bidders bid according to the equilibrium bid functions in
both periods. Note that the rst-round bid function only depends on a bidders high value. Hence, any
protable rst-round deviation of bidder i of type xh; xl can be described as bidding as if his high value
were z rather than xh. The payo¤ from such a bid when z  xl is:
U1(z;xh; xl) =
Z xl
x

xh + xl   `(S21 (y1; ))  y1

f
(2N 2)
1 (y1) dy1 +
Z z
xl

xh   `(S21 (y1; ))

f
(2N 2)
1 (y1) dy1
+
Z x
z
Z xh
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = y1

dy2f
(2N 2)
1 (y1) dy1:
Recall that `
 
S21 (z; )

= E
h
Y
(2N 2)
2 jY (2N 2)1 = z
i
: Hence, di¤erentiating U1(z;xh; xl) with respect to z
yields:
xh   `(S21 (z; )) 
Z xh
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

dy2

f
(2N 2)
1 (z)
=
Z z
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

dy2  
Z xh
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

dy2

f
(2N 2)
1 (z)
=
Z z
xh
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

dy2

f
(2N 2)
1 (z) ;
which is negative if z > xh and zero if z  xh; since f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

= 0 for y2 > z: Hence
bidding as if z = xh (i.e., according to the equilibrium bidding function) is optimal (among all z  xl). It
remains to be shown that bidder i does not want to bid as if his high value is z < xl:
Bidder is payo¤ from bidding as if his high type is z < xl is:
U1(z;xh; xl) =
Z z
x

xh + xl   `(S21 (y1; ))  y1

f
(2N 2)
1 (y1) dy1
+
Z x
z
Z xh
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = y1

dy2f
(2N 2)
1 (y1) dy1:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields:
xh + xl   `(S21 (z; ))  z  
Z xh
x
[xh   y2]f (2N 2)2

y2jY (2N 2)1 = z

dy2

f
(2N 2)
1 (z) = (xl   z) f (2N 2)1 (z) ;
which is positive: Hence bidding as if z < xl is never optimal. 
Proof of Theorem 8. By (2), (3), and (4) we have that conditional on bidder i of type (xh; xl) being
the rst-round price setter, the second round expected price is:
E [P2jP1]
= S21 (xh; xl) PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg+AS22 (xh) + S21 (xh; xl) PrfY (2)2 > xhjY (2)1 > xhg+MS22 (xh)
= S21 (xh; xl) +A
S2
2 (xh) +M
S2
2 (xh)
= P1 +A
S2
2 (xh) +M
S2
2 (xh):
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
Now consider the example with F (x) = xa and `(p) = p1+r=(1 + r): We have:
2(xh; xljxh > Y (2N 2)1 ) = (1 + r)
1
1+r (xl)
1
1+r
2(xh; xljxh < Y (2N 2)1 ) = (1 + r)
1
1+r (xh)
1
1+r
1(xh; xl) = (1 + r)
1
1+r

a (2N   3)
a (2N   3) + 1xh
 1
1+r
The expected price in the last round, round 2, conditional on the rst-round price P1 = 1(xh; xl) is:
E
h


Y
(2N 2)
2

jY (2N 2)1 = xh
i
PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg+ (xh) PrfY (2)2 > xhjY (2)1 > xhg
Note:
PrfY (2)2 < xhjY (2)1 > xhg =
Z 1
xh
Z xh
0
2f(x)f(y)
1
1  F 2(xh)dxdy =
2F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
E [P2jP1 = 1(xh; xl)]
= (1 + r)
1
1+r E

Y
(2N 2)
2
 1
1+r jY (2N 2)2  xh

2F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
+ (1 + r)
1
1+r (xh)
1
1+r
1  F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
= (1 + r)
1
1+r
(Z xh
0
z
1
1+r a(2N   3)z
a(2N 3) 1
x
a(2N 3)
h
dz
2F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
+ x
1
1+r
h
1  F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
)
= (1 + r)
1
1+r x
1
1+r
h
Z 1
0
z
1
1+r a(2N   3)za(2N 3) 1dz 2F (xh)
1 + F (xh)
+
1  F (xh)
1 + F (xh)

It follows that the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the rst-round price is:
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
R 1
0 z
1
1+r a(2N   3)za(2N 3) 1dz 2xah1+xah +
1 xah
1+xah
a(2N 3)
a(2N 3)+1
 1
1+r
=

a(2N   3) + 1
a(2N   3)
 1
1+r (a(2N   3)) 2x
a
h
1+xah
+

a(2N   3) + 11+r

1 xah
1+xah
a(2N   3) + 11+r

=

a(2N   3) + 1
a(2N   3)
 1
1+r
0@a(2N   3) + 11+r 1 xah1+xah
a(2N   3) + 11+r

1A :
The expected value of the price ratio is
E

E [P2jP1]
P1

=
(a(2N   3) + 1) 11+r

a(2N   3) + 11+r
R 1
0
1 xa
1+xaN(N   1)2ax2a 1
 
1  x2ax2a(N 2)dx
(a(2N   3)) 11+r

a(2N   3) + 11+r

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Now consider the sequential English auction.
Proof of Theorem 9. In the second round, when bidder i is not the current winner and the current loss
bid is below is valuation of the object, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder i to raise the price.
Thus, we only need to show that the rst round strategies are optimal.
Consider bidder i, i 6= 1; 2: If all other bidders follow their equilibrium strategies, then in the rst round
bidder i cannot protably deviate from his equilibrium strategy. On the equilibrium path, such a bidder
only wins if his valuation xi is one of the two highest, and when he wins (independently of the round) he
pays a price equal to 

Y
(N 1)
2

and makes a (positive) prot equal to xi Y (N 1)2 : There is no deviation
which would ever make bidder i either win at a lower price, or win and make a positive prot when he is
not one of the two highest valuation bidders.
Now consider bidder i = 1; 2: Without loss of generality, let i = 1: An argument similar to the one in
the previous paragraph shows that there is no protable deviation for bidder 1 once one of the bidders
j 6= 1; 2 has entered the bidding. It only remains to show that, before such an entry, bidder 1 of type x1 will
stop raising the price when it reaches the level E1E(x1) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
2 jY (N 1)1 = x1
i
; that is, bidder 1
does not want to bid as if his type were z 6= x1: Consider rst the option of dropping out (temporarily) at
a price P = E1E(z) < 
E
1E(x1), and then resuming the bidding till the price reaches  (x1) if a bidder j 6= 2
enters. Let U1(x1;x1) be the payo¤ of type x1 of bidder 1 if he follows his equilibrium strategy, raising the
price above P , and let U1(z;x1) be the payo¤ if he deviates and drops out (temporarily) at price P . The
only di¤erence in the payo¤s from the two strategies is in the event that bidder 2s type x2 is less than x1,
but higher than all other bidderstypes. In such a case, bidder 1 wins in the rst round at a price E1E(x2)
if he follows the equilibrium strategy, while he wins at a price (Y (N 2)1 ) if he deviates. Thus,
U1(x1;x1)  U1(z;x1)
=
Z x1
z
h
E
h
Y
(N 2)
1 jY (N 2)1  x2
i
  `  E1E(x2)i f(x2)1  F (z)dx2
=
Z x1
z
h
E
h
Y
(N 1)
2 jY (N 1)1 = x2
i
  `  E1E(x2)i f(x2)1  F (z)dx2 = 0;
and the deviation is not protable.
Now consider the option of dropping out (temporarily) at a price P = E1E(z) > 
E
1E(x1). The only
di¤erence in the payo¤s from following the equilibrium strategy (dropping out at price E1E(x1)) and
deviating is in the event that bidder 2s type x2 is the highest of all bidderstypes, including x1; but it is
less than z. In such a case, bidder 1 wins in the rst round at a price E1E(x2) if he deviates. He wins at a
price (Y (N 2)1 ) when Y
(N 2)
1 < x1 if he follows the equilibrium strategy. Since for x2 > x1 it is
x1   `
 
E1E(x2)

FN 2(x2) =
h
x1   E
h
Y
(N 1)
2 jY (N 1)1 = x2
ii
FN 2(x2)
=
h
x1   E
h
Y
(N 2)
1 jY (N 2)1  x2
ii
FN 2(x2)
<
h
x1   E
h
Y
(N 2)
1 jY (N 2)1  x1
ii
FN 2(x1);
the deviation is not protable. 
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